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PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the current 
status of the jewelry industry, with an emphasis on diamonds. 
An analysis of the conditions for failure and success will be 
the basis for evaluating strategies for survival in this 
turbulent industry. These strategies will be directed toward 
managers, since good and strong management is necessary if a 
company is to survive throughout rough times. Other areas of 
focus will include a marketing and financial perspective on 
strategies for management to consider in order to have a 
successful survival strategy. 
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-I. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The jewelry industry is in an uproar. Many major 
chains are going through intense reconstruction, and mCl.ny 
are doing so under the protection of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. 
The industry is in the midst of a recession and United 
States demand is sluggish. In the February 1, 1992 issue of 
National Jeweler, the Jewelers Board of Trade announced that 
:316 businesses in the industry went under in 1991. and that 
184 of these were in the Northeast and Southeast parts of 
the country (Beres. 1992 February 1). 
Retail jewelers are facing many problems as a result of 
the current economic status and the changing structure of 
the industry. Sales are decreasing, profit margins are 
tightening and customer values and attitudes are changing. 
The growth of the United States jewelry market has 
stabilized and competition is increasing. 
Those companies remaining in the industry will have to 
fOGUS on a strategy of survival. All areas of the business 
will be affected and each must rely upon their critical 
SUCGess factors to survive. The critical success factors in 
the jewelry industry include creating a desirable image, 
:r·aieing profit margins. and maintaining market niches. 
For each functional area of the company. a strategy 
will have to be created for survival. Craig S. Rice (1990) 
outlines generic strategies of survival for six functional 
areas. In production, the system will have to be studied. 
copied and improved. The objective of sales will be to 
protect the market niches. Finance will have to concentrate 
-on controlling and cutting costs. while management must 
control costs and increase sales. Technicians will have to 
buy available innovations. and the staff will have to be at 
its most efficient. 
This paper will discuss the current status of the 
jewelry industry and the failure and success of businesses. 
It will also evaluate three functional areas of the retail 
jewelry store: management. marketing and finance. 
Strategies and ideas for survival in the 1990's will be the 
focus. 
II. RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY 
A. An Overview 
The jewelry industry in general, and the diamond 
industry specifically, are unique. Most jewelers rely upon 
diamond sales for the majority of their revenue. and 
consider these sales to be their top priority. The diamond 
market is constructed differently from most markets, and one 
reason why this particular industry is interesting to be 
involved in. 
The mining and marketing of diamonds is controlled by 
two companies which create one of the world 's 1.~rgest and 
strongest cartels. The mining of gold and diamonds is 
controlled by the Anglo-American Corp. This company, which 
is at the center of the world's largest mining group located 
in South Africa. is also known as "the mighty gol(j and 
minerals holding company" (Fuhrman. 1991 September 16, 
p.131). The marketing of the diamond rough (Ot' the uncut, 
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unpolished stones that come from the mines) is controlled by 
the sister company of the Anglo-American Corp .. De Beers. 
De Beers controls over 90% of the diamond market for rough 
stones and markets them through their Central Selling 
Organisation located in London. England. De Beers itself is 
also located in South Africa. Together these two companies 
control the supply and demand for diamonds allover the 
world. 
The marketing and sale of diamonds is unique only to 
this market. Stephanie Gaunt. manager of Harry Gaunt 
,Jewelers in Downtown Muncie. IN. describes the process 
involved in bringing the diamonds to the retail level. 
Once De Beers sends diamond rough to the C.S.O. for its 
sale. the cutters of these stones are gathered. There are 
approximately 120 cutters that are invited into the De Beers 
"family of cutters" and each are given a box of diamond 
rough. These cutters do not have the opportunity to choose 
which rough stones they want. they simply take wflat they are 
given and pay their $1 to 2 million. From this point on. it 
is the cutter's responsibility to regain their investment. 
The cutting of the diamond rough is a very important 
element of the selling process. It is the cutter's 
responsibility to cut the diamonds in order to use as much 
of trle :rough and Gut the best quality stones possible. Most 
often. these are the round brilliant cuts because they are 
the easiest to cut and also because much of the rough is 
wae.ted when the cutter cuts the fancy shapes. such as a 
marquise. oval or pear. The smaller stones tend to be of 
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better clarity because the cutter has the ability to cut the 
stones around the inclusions of the rough. Therefore. t.he 
Gutter must cut so as to gain the highest possible quality 
from each piece of rough. 
The round stones are not only the easiest to cut, but 
also the most brilliant. In the 1919, mathematician::: 
discovered that precision in cutting the round stones 
yielded the maximum brilliance possible. The round stones 
are cut with fifty-eight facets, with each facet a certain 
percentage of the entire diamond. As a result. the round 
brilliant cut diamonds contain the greatest optimum visual 
properties (Kassoy 1977). 
After the diamonds are cut, the cutter then sells the 
diamonds to the retail level. Those retailers that f,>Un.::ha:3e 
their diamonds from one of the 120 cutters that associate 
with De Beers receive the best in the industry. 
At the retail level. the jeweler does have the 
opportunity to choose those stones he/she wishes to sell. 
Ttle jeweler bases his/her decision for buying on the same 
principles that the consumer should. These principles are 
referred to in the industry as "the four C's": cut. 
clarity, color and carat weight. 
As previously discussed. the cut not only refers to 
the shape of the stone. but also to the excellence of the 
cut i tse If. The measurements and the locat ion of ,:my 
inclusions are all important factors in determining tlle 
quality of the cut of the stone. 
One of the most important aspects when buying a 
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diamond is the clarity of the stone (Kassoy 1977). The GIA 
(Gemological Institute of America) developed standards upon 
which all diamonds are graded. In Appendix A, the greatest 
clarity classification is the flawless diamond. These aye 
diamonds in which, under ten power magnification, no 
internal or external inclusions are seen. The scale then 
decreases in levels of clarity to the imperfect stone. 
Imperfect stones are ones in which the inclusions are 
visible to the naked eye. These particular stones lack 
luster and brilliance, and are often times very cloudy. 
Another important aspect in selecting a diamond is the 
color of the stone. This refers to overall body colo:r·, not 
the spectrum of colors the eye receives as the light is 
refracted by the body of the diamond. The colorles:.3 
diamonds are the best. As Appendix A shows, these are in 
the D-E-F range. As the scale continues, the "yellowness" of 
the diamond is graded. The more yellow the diamond 
contains, the less expensive and rare it is. This is true 
until the fancy yellow grade is reached, and then the rarity 
is more prevalent and this is reflected in the price. "nlcBe 
fancy yellow diamonds are referred to as canary diamonds. 
Carat weight should be the least important factor to 
consider. A carat is the defined unit of weight for a 
diamond, and each carat is divided into smaller units called 
points. There are one hundred points in every carat. 
therefore twenty-five points would be a quarter carat. fifty 
pointB would be a half-carat. etc. 
Clarity and color should really be the determining 
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-factors when purchasing a diamond. These are the 
characteristics that give beauty to the diamond, and that 
place the monetary value on the stone. According to 
Stephanie Gaunt, out of every 100 tons of are, 10.000 carats 
of diamonds are mined. One in 5000 of these diamonds will 
be flawless and one in 5000 of these diamonds will be D in 
color. Also, 80% of the diamonds that are mined only 
qualify for industrial use. These stones are Sf.) included 
that they can not even be considered an Imperfect stone. 
Therefore. flawless diamonds and colorless diamonds are vely 
:rare and very special. 
A comparison of carat weight. color and clarity to 
overall diamond sales from 1976 through 1990 is found in 
Appendix B. In the past few years, carat weight has played 
an increasingly important role in the selection of diamondB. 
ee.peclally since 1984. The weight changed from around a 
third of a carat to well over a half carat. 
In order for consumers to purchase more carat weight, 
other factors decreased in importance. Color, although the 
median remained fairly consistent within the H-range. became 
less important to consumers. The importance of the clarity 
of the stone also decreased. Between 1976 and 1990. the 
median fell from VS1 (very slightly included to the fiY:3t 
degree) to Bll (slightly included to the first degree). 
The changes that have occurred within the market could 
have IIlany reasons. The American view that "bigger is 
better" could be one reason for the emphasiS on size l:".::tther-
than color or clarity. Another could be that the supply of 
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-these flawless and near colorless stones is so restricted 
that the cost is too expensive for the average consumer. 
Whatever the reason, more emphasis has been placed on the 
size of the stone in the past few years. 
B. Current Economic Conditions 
The economy is weak. The dollar is down against other 
currencies, interest rates are low and unemployment rates 
are high. Appendix C shows regional sales and the economic 
factors which affect them. These statistics are based on 
May 1991 figures, however, but they are a good indicator of 
the market conditions which have led to the failure of many 
companies. Especially interesting to note is the increase 
in the consumer price index and the unemployment rate in May 
of 1991 compared to 1990. Also, the start-up of new jewelry 
finns is negative in comparison to 1990 and failures are 
increasing in every region of the country. 
The statistics found in Appendix C are consistent with 
those found in Appendix D, which shows the personal 
consumption of jewelry from 1980 through 1990 in millions 
of 1982 dollars (with 1982 being the base year). Jewelry is 
compared to all durable goods, and since jewelry is' 
considered a lUXUry item. a fall in the consumption of this 
good would be evident before more stable items. The 
consumption of jewelry did fall in 1987, and the consumption 
of all durables fell in 1990. When viewing this data, 
recognition of the fall in the stock market in 1987 is also 
essential. Consumer confidence fell dl'amatically tjuring 
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-this time. 
In the general economic situation, other statistics 
also indicate consistency with these observations. A 
listing of the Personal Consumption Expenditures in total 
reflects a decrease in the fourth quarter of 1990. as noted 
in Appendix E, and the Gross National Product also plunges 
in the fourth quarter of 1990 for the first time since 1986. 
Both of these listings are adjusted for inflation by using 
the value of the 1982 dollar as the base. 
All of these statistics indicate that a recession 
started in 1990. With all of these indicators pointing in 
the same direction, it is not a surprise that many jewelry 
stores have failed in attempting to counter the increasing 
economic pressure. 
C. Current Industry Conditions 
The jewelry industry is in the the midst of major 
changes. The consolidation trend of the 1980's is over. and 
the focus is on the independent retailer. Many of the 
meg~-ch~ins h~ve failed, and this has created a" •.. 'ripple 
effect' ... [where] Ever-;/one in the industry in some way is 
affected" (Beres, 1992 Febru~ry I, p.30). This effect hds 
undoubtedly caused fear and anxiety for all jewelers about 
the future. 
With the market in upheaval. De Beers is also feeling 
the effects of the current industry and economic situation. 
Reporte indicate that De Beers profits fell 14% in the first 
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part of 1991 from the same period a year earlier. and 
reasons cited include the Persian Gulf War and the weak 
market conditions (Sielaff. 1991 October 1). Later reports 
show that their sales for the second half were up 9% over 
1990. but De Beers claims that this is no indication of 
better conditions for 1992 (Sielaff. 1992 February 1). 
Since De Beers controls so much of the market and is 
the strongest cartel in any commodity in the world, they 
must maintain price stability. The market is currently 
unable to withstand any type of price increases. The last 
increase by De Beers in the price of their rough was in 
March of 1990 with a 5% average increase (Sielaff, 1992 
February 1). As noted in Appendix F. De Beers has 
historically maintained no set method for price increases 
except to control supply and demand to maintain stability in 
the price of diamonds. 
With the economy so sluggish. De Beers must carefully 
maintain its strategy of " .. single-channel marketing .. ," 
(Diamond Registry Bulletin. 1991 May 31. p.1) to ensure 
stable prices. and the control over their supply sources lS 
necessary to achieve this objective. De Beers has reached 
agreements with four major diamond producers. These include 
agreements with Russia. Angola. Botswana and Australia for 
the marketing of their diamonds through the C.S.O. (Shor. 
1991 October). As shown in the chart in Appendix G. these 
are some of the major diamond producers in the world. 
Control over these markets will greatly enhance the future 
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-of De Beers. 
Since the majority of the jewelry industry is affected 
by De Beers. and De Beers controls the Central Selling 
Organisation. the C.S.O. has also reported problems. The 
sale of rough diamonds fell 6% in 1991 ("CSO Rough", 1992 
February). As noted in Appendix H. the sales were flat for 
the first part of 1991 and declined during the second half 
of the year. The C.S.O. feels that "once a better consumer 
environment takes shape" ("CSO Rough tI, 1992 Febl"-llary, 
p.43)), sales will increase. 
The economic crunch is really hurting the retail 
jewelers much more than any other part of the industry_ 
Many of the mega-chain retailers have filed Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy or are in serious financial trouble as the 
industry is shifting away from them and toward the 
independent retailers. These troubled companies include Zale 
Corp.. Barry's J ewe 1 ers. Larry Rob i nson Group, C&H R,:\ u.ch. 
Ratner's Group pIc, and many others. 
Zale Corp. is the most publicized failure in the 
industry. most likely because it is the nation's largest 
fine jewelry retailer with 1.938 stores around t.he CCllmtl"Y. 
The 1991 Annual Report of Zale's Corp. reveals that the 
company is actually a subsidiary of People's Jcweller"s in 
Toronto and their partner Swarovski International of 
Switzerland. This partnership acquired Zale Corp. in early 
1987 by acquiring the company at approximately $40.00/share. 
In 1989. the newly reorganized Zale Corp. acquired GOrd0!iB 
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Jewelers. the nation's second largest retailer. 
On December 2. 1991. the company failed to make a $52 
million interest payment on loans and junk bonds. This was 
postponed to gauge Christmas sales, which fell 11% from the 
previous year (Beres. 1992 February 1). In response, four 
involuntary bankruptcy petitions were filed against Zale 
Corp. 
The company attempted to reorganize themselves without 
Chapter 11 protection by closing 400 stores. reorganizing 
into four divisions, releasing 2500 employees and selling 
inventory to liquefy their position (Beres. 1992 January 
16). On January 23. 1992. however, Zale Corp. filed Chapter 
11. 
Other major chains are also having problems. Barry's 
Jewelers. the nation's third largest retailer. missed a $3.2 
million interest payment due to bondholders on May 1. 1991. 
Under Chapter 11 protection. Barry's will close 70 of it~ 
214 stores and restructure themselves (Rubin. 1991 July 16). 
Larry Robinson Group, a two-chain retailer based in 
Cleveland. OH. is also in financial trouble. The two chains 
now under Chapter 11 are the four-unit Antwerp Diamond 
Center and the Royal Jewelry Operations (Beres. 1992 
February 1). 
Ratners Group pIc. a British firm. is in the midst of 
turmoil. Their chairman. Gerald Ratner. has stepped down 
from his position and the company is in crisis due to the 
large amount of debt they accumulated when they acquired f(;jjl 
Jewelers. Sterling. Inc. is their other major U.S. chain. 
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Ratner is the world's largest jewelry retailer with over 
2,000 stores worldwide. 
Other filings for Chapter 11 by jewelry store chains 
include the Glennpeter chain, which is a subsidiary of GPB 
Inc .. and VanScoy Jewelers. who operate the Diamond Mine 
Stores. The president of the Jewelers Board of Trade. 
Nat.haniel Earle. stated that the reason for so many failures 
in the industry is that "When the economy was doing well. a 
lot. of companies amassed huge amounts of debt because 
projections were high, with no end in sight ... " (Beres, 1992 
February 1. p.28). Now that the economy is weak. the debt 
is too much for these corporations to handle. Larry 
Robinson said that " ... I have never seen a more difficult 
period in the retail business in general. and the jewelry 
business in particular ... " (Beres. 1992 January 16, p.159). 
With all of the failures that are occurring in the 
industry. many companies are. however, surviving. Tiffany & 
Co. is one company that has begun to turn itself around in 
the last few years. 
The New York-based jewelry store initially sold goods 
such as umbrellas, pottery and Chinese goods. Eventually. 
they added silver, gold and diamonds to their product lines. 
Today, Tiffany is much more than a retail store, for it ie: 
considered part museum and showplace. 
Since 1979, however, Tiffany has lost prestige, and 
this occurred during the time that the company was owned by 
Avon Products (1979-1984). Sales fell dramatically due to 
Avon; 5 ch,:tngE' in the product 1 ine ($14 stemware versus 
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inventory, lack of glamour and a flat advertising budget (F. 
Rice, 1989 November 20). 
In 1984, William R. Chaney led the management group 
that bought Tiffany & Co. from Avon in a $136 million 
leveraged buyout (Trachtenberg, 1989 February 6). He took 
the company public in 1987, and is now the chairman and 
chief executive officer. Donald Trump, the millionaire 
playboy, attempted to purchase $15 million worth of Tiffany 
& Co. 's stock. but Chaney protected the company's interests 
by selling a 10% stake in Tiffany to Mitsukoshi. Ltd .• an 
upscale Japanese firm (Roman, 1989 October 9). This action 
made it impossible for Trump to purchase those shares, 
Since Tiffany has gone public. marketing and 
advertising has been refocused to include the affluent 
customer, exclusivity. the international consumer. the 
highly paid working woman and special causes and events (F. 
Rice. 1989 November 20). Tiffany is poised for a 20% growth 
rate for the next five years. 
Recent statistics released by National Jeweler indicate 
that 1991 sales were up 11% from the previous year and lJP 6% 
in the United States alone (Sielaff. 1991 October 1). The 
company has been effectively reaching the affluent by 
targeting tourism and resort spots and is reaching the 
" ... corporate customer through [their] Selection'B 
Catalog ... " (Sielaff. 1991 October 1. p.4). Despite 
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the poor economic conditions and changes in the industry, 
Tiffany & Co. is doing well. 
The jewelry industry is definitely in a difficult 
situation. Restructuring, refinancing and strategies to 
deal with these changes will be the focus of the survival 
strategy of the 1990's. 
D. Conditions ~or Failure 
The decade of the 1990's will assess failure and 
success in the jewelry industry. Many studies about the 
reasons companies fail and succeed have been done, and many 
causes have been documented. Two studies will be discussed 
on each topic: failure and success. The only conclusion 
that is important, however. is the need for a company to 
evaluate its environment and develop strategies to counter 
the problems and changes. 
Robert D. Boyle and Harsha B. Desai (1991 July) 
publ ished a study of companies in trouble. In tht:'! ~t\l.dy. 
they indicated factors which contribute toward the failure 
of small firms. These factors are categorized into four 
areas: 1) internal, which is under the control of the 
firm, 2) external. which is out of the the control of the 
firm, 3) administrative. which includes scheduling 
procedures, managing employees and analyzing reports, and 4) 
strategic. which refers to long-term tasks such as planning. 
These four areas are then used to identify problem 
areas for the firm and a two by two matrix is constructed to 
determine general strategies to increase the performance I)f 
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each of these individual categories are: 
1) Internal Pidm1 n.i st<-~:;t 1/12: fai lure to carefully 
analyze statements, inadequate capital 
requirements, improper management of accounts 
receivable, declining profit margins. and large 
increases in debt. 
2) Internal Strategic: 
knowledge, declining 
optimism and lack of 
planning. 
lack of product or market 
market shares, excessive 
comprehensive strategic 
3) E'ite.<-nal.HdminiEt,,·-,;:,'ti·/E:': the injury of someone 
from the company's product, or illness/injury of 
the principal manager. 
4) E:te;;~.:."} ,~~;·t;:::te,}i"::; declining market share. sudden 
drop in the numbers of inquiries, and a national, 
regional or local economic downturn. 
The jewelry industry appears to have problem areas in 
all four of these categories. Another study, however, will 
be discussed before these are considered further. 
In their book Effective Small Business Management, 
Richard M. Hodgetts and Donald F. Kuratko (1989) introduce a 
study done by Dun and Bradstreet. For the retail industry, 
Dun and Bradstreet released the findings of one of their 
1987 stUdies with a report on the greatest causes of 
business failure. In percentages. these statistics do not 
equal 100% because of overlapping causes. but the causes and 
their respective percentages are: 
1} Neglect (2.2X)~' this includes bad habits. business 
conflicts. lack of interest 
. ..,) D.is2ster Causes (:J, ex);: this includes Acts of God, 
burglary, employee fraud 
,t-:rauc:! CaUSES (O.4~'~·'. this includes embezzlement, 
false agreements 
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of the market. 
5) Experience Causes (22. ··:lX): this includes 
incompetence and lack 
of experience 
6) Sales Causes r14.5~): this includes being 
competitively weak, 
inventory difficulties, poor 
location 
7) E.:-:oense c,,:wses:"7. :::X): this includes burdensome 
debt, heavy operating 
expense 
5') Customer Cause.s u. r;): this includes receivables 
difficulties, too few 
customers 
9) Asset CausEs (O.6~): this includes excessive fixed 
assets, overexpansion 
1n) Capit.-al C·~"lu.se~: U.1X): this includes burdensome 
contracts and excessive 
withdrawals. 
These are the basic reasons that Dun and Bradstreet 
cite as the causes of failure in businesses with emphasis on 
the retail stores. Many similarities exist between the t.wo 
studies as to the causes for failure. Management and 
planning problems appear to be the most common sources for 
failure. In an industry where 93 out 10.000 jewelry stores 
fail. management needs to be aware of all of the aspects of 
the company (Hodgetts and Kuratko. 1989). 
E. Conditions ~or Success 
In the strategy of survival. many companies may fail 
and some will succeed. Those who are successful will have 
to work hard in order to achieve stability within the 
industry. Paul Resnick (1988) introduces ten conditione: for 
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survival and success in his book The Small Business Bible. 
One of the first conditions for success is to be 
objective. Objectivity must be maintained in the 
"assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the company, 
and your business and management skills" (Resnick, 1988, 
p.3). This coincides with the second condition of keeping 
the plan simple and focused. 
The third condition is to provide excellent and 
distinctive goods and services that meet the wants and needs 
of a select group of consumers. These consumers are the 
basis for the fourth condition. which is determining how to 
reach and sell to the customers. 
The fifth condition of success is to build, manage and 
motivate an excellent staff. These should be people that 
are reliable and trustworthy to help the manager do what he 
or she can not do alone. 
Conditions six and seven are related to understanding 
the financial aspect of the company. The sixth C("!Iic1ition i~ 
to keep accounting records and controls that must be used to 
understand and manage a business, and the seventh condition 
is to never run out of cash. 
The last three conditions include avoiding the pitfalls 
of rapid growth. such as carrying too much debt. 
diversifying into the wrong areas, etc .. understanding the 
business inside and out, and planning ahead: 
These generic conditions for success and survival lead 
to the strategies which Boyle and Desai have Gt'eateli in 
thei:r two by two matrix. The strategies are located in 
17 
---
Appendix I and can be specified to any company. 
For internal administrative problems. success will 
depend upon implementing strategies to improve policies. 
procedures. rules and systems. An analysis of these areas 
is necessary to determine which factors need attention. In 
doing the evaluation. it is necessary to remain objective. 
Solving internal strategic problems will involve 
ii" • increased analysis. better planning and positioning of 
the firm's product ... through market research .. ," (Boyle and 
Desai. 1991 July. p.39). 
In the external environment. administrative problems 
can be countered wi th risk management. The most c()mmon 
response for this is " ... purchasing liability insurance ... " 
(Boyle and Desai. 1991 July. p.39). External strategic 
problems involve the market. The strategies for survival 
include product development. diversification. niching. 
market development and market penetration. which involves 
" ... niching in a market unexplored by the competition, 
eepeci,:tlly one which the firm is uniquely qualified to 
occupy and defend ... " (Boyle and Desai. 1991 July. p,-39), 
These are strategies necessary for survival and 
success. In the next sections. most of thAse areas will he 
addressed specifically to the survival of firms in the 
ret,:ti 1 jewel:ry induetry, 
III. EVALUATION 
A. Management 
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In every business in every industry. it appears that 
good management is the factor which determines survival and 
success, and bad management determines failure. A good 
manager must be concerned with and knowledgeable about all 
aspects of the business. These include recognizing changing 
trends. not only within the industry. but also in terrr~ of 
consumer behavior and demographics; the ability to 
understand the financial aspect of the company; maintaining 
employee satisfaction: developing strategies to increase 
sales and maintain market niches; and creating innovative 
ideas and product mixes to counter the competition. improve 
the image of the company, and meet the needs of the 
consumer. 
1. Consumer and Demographic Trends 
Following consumer behavior and demographic trends is 
one of the aspects of being a manager in any industry that 
is crucial to success. This is important because trends can 
help the manager foresee changes and then adjust the 
company's strategy to meet those changes. The average 
consumer in the jewelry industry has changed within the last 
few years and is continuing to change. 
Compared to thirty years ago. the median age of the 
United States population is higher than it has ever been. 
AS seen in Appendix J, the median age is currently between 
thirty -two and thirty-three years of age. The inct'ea~ j n~1 
age of the average American consumer places a great deal of 
pressure on childbearing. Therefore less emphasis is beillg 
placed on " ... money to spend on luxuries ... " (Buchanan and 
19 
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Yochim. 1991 October. p.43). 
As a result. consumer attitudes are changing. 
Americans are changing their views on spending, placing mOl"'e 
emphasis on " ... family-oriented products like vacation homes 
(rather) than on jewelry ... " (Buchanan and Yochim, 1991 
October. p.43). With this emphasis on the family. jewelers 
will have to create. market and evaluate products and images 
that will reflect these attitudes. 
The marketplace is also becoming more global. This is 
occurring not only because of increased competition. but 
also because there is a cuI tural mix of customers who ar·e 
seeking high quality and service. As the world becomes more 
global, the population is more diverse and customers will 
come from many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. 
Managers will have to be more conscious and empathetic 
towards different values. ideas and beliefs. 
Time is a scarcity for the consumer of the 1990's. 
Most families are two-income or one-parent families. leaving 
little time for the consumer to spend by his/herself. 
Whichever the reason. time is considered more of a scarcity 
today than money (Buchanan and Yochim. 1991 October). 
Overall. with the weak market conditions and changing 
demographics within the United States. consumers are more 
c~utious of where their money is being spent. Managers must 
recognize these trends and prepare for them. otherwise they 
will not succeed in maintaining a successful company. 
2. Understanding Financial StatementB 
Understanding the financial aspect of the company is 
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also of vital importance. The ability to read and evaluate 
balance sheets. income statements and sales projections is 
necessary because these will indicate the status of the 
company and any problem areas which exist. Knowledge in 
this area will help the manager understand what changes in 
revenue. costs. assets or liabilities will have to be made 
in order to achieve a maximum profit level. 
Important financial aspects which the manager must be 
made aware include sales. costs. market share and profits; 
Frank Zimmerman. author of The Turnaround Experience, cites 
six areas which will indicate whether a company is in 
trouble. and which a manager should understand: 
1. Profits are down. declining from the previous four 
year average. The downward spiral has extended for a period 
of at least one year. 
2, Competitors profitability surpasses your own. 
Your profits are considerably lower than the industry 
average and some competitors are clearly able to achieve 
higher profit margins selling similar products. 
3. Real revenue (adjusted for inflation) has 
declined. 
4. Market share is shrinking and you have lost key 
distributors. or prices have slipped. 
5. Investors. board members or managers have lost 
faith. They have expressed concerns regarding the condition 
of the company and its policies. 
6. Cash flow is poor. you do not have cash on hand 
to pay the bills or meet current obligations (cited in 
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Wallace, 1991 October, p.36). 
If management recognizes these fundamental points 
within financial statements, and any problems within their 
company before the spiral rapidly goes downward, then the 
company can change its strategies to counter them. 
Analyzing basic financial data is necessary for any manager 
to understand because it is so crucial to the success of a 
company. A complete analysiS of the financial statements of 
Zale Corp. for two years will be in a later section of thi3 
paper. 
3. Employee Satis~action 
Employee satisfaction is also a responsibility of 
management, and one that will enhance a company if done 
properly. Reliable, hardworking and educated people are a 
scarcity in today's market and understanding employee needs 
and developing methods to meet those needs is important. 
Brenner, Pringle and Greenhaus (1991 July) state that job 
clarity, defined rules and procedures development of skill~. 
increasing personal knowledge of the business and the 
industry. job security. intellectual stimulation and. 
personal achievement are all priorities which employees 
graduating from college desire in an employment pO!3it.ion 
(69). Successful tactics for maintaining and creating 
employee satisfaction are training and a Management. By 
Objectives program. 
In order to enhance the employee's personal 
satisfaction with the position and incorporate knowledge. 
training will be an essential part of management's 
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whether through short-cuts increased sales and the steps to 
take to perform them. 
5) Throughout the year, the manager has a basis for 
evaluating the worker's performance, such as an evaluation 
form. 
6) The results are measured against the objectives 
along with an arbitrary evaluation of the job performed. 
There are many benefits to a Management By Objectives 
program. It is a comprehensive and easy program to 
understand because the manager identifies the objectives and 
those individuals who are responsible for achieving tl'lenL 
Also. the worker knows exactly what is expected of him/her 
and when the objectives are to be attained. This allows trle 
rnanager to identify the objectives which are critical to the 
company and to coordinate activities among varioue 
individuals, departments or groups so that resources can be 
concentrated on the more important aspects of the {~(')mpi1ny ~ 
Tt-aining and a Management By Objectives program wi 11 
allow the employee to feel comfortable in his position ~o 
that the company will run smoothly. These tactics will be 
successful as long as the manager realizes the trends tlldt 
are occurring in the marketplace and those that are 
occurring within his/her organization. Management must be 
competent and able to plan for any changes that occur on all 
levels of the industry. because the company will be 
::tff~Gteii . 
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-Management responsibilities also include the 
development of strategies to increase sales and maintain 
market niches. and the creation of innovative ideas and 
product mixes to counter the competition. improve the image 
of the company and meet the needs of the consumers. These 
particular aspects will be focused upon more in the next 
section. since they also relate directly to the marketing 
functions of the company. 
B. Marketlng 
Marketing is a vital element of success for any 
business. E.!tch company must perform some type of market 
03.na.lysis in order to discover any problem areas wh.ich exist 
and develop strategies to increase the per'formance of the 
company. The most important r01es of marketing an~ to 
develop strategies for increasing sales and maintaining 
market niches. and to create innovative ideas and product 
mixes to counter the competition. improve the image of the 
company and to meet the needs of the consumer. 
A market analysis is the breaking down of each 
component of the market and evaluating it. Those components 
which wi 11 be focused upon in this section are the c()r:~1irflf"r, 
the competition. the image. the pricing structure and 
advertising. 
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1. Define the Consumer 
As mentioned the previous section, the trends in 
consumer behavior and demographics are changing. TIle first 
step in a market analysis is to define who the consumer is 
for the company involved. In his book Why Entrepreneurs 
Fail. James W. Halloran (1991) outlines a method for 
identifying the company's target market. Target marketing 
is the "breaking down of the overall market for a good or 
service to the segment that utilizes it the most" (f{allol",3fl. 
1991. p.77). The objective is to discover who the target 
market is and what the needs of this market are ~ TIJ!:~ 
questions that should be answered in order to define this 
market include: 
1) Who is the prime consumer? 
2) What is their age? 
3) What is their income? 
4) What is their education level? 
5) What is their sex? 
6) What is their marital status? 
7) What are their hobbies? 
8) What is their lifestyle? 
Answers to these questions will help the 
m~Tketer/mi:!.ni:!.ger detennine i:!. str"-tegy which wi II hf' til i 1 ;-'1'-~d 
to meet the needs of this target market. Therefore. the 
next step in defining the consumer is to identify th~ir 
needs. Some questions to be answered include: 
1) What needs are being fulfilled by the 
product/service your company offers? 
2) Which is the segment with t.he greatest unfulfilled 
need? 
3) What is the consumer's compensation if this need 
~an not be fulfilled? 
4) What is the financial capability of this market to 
purchase? 
5) Who are the leaders and the trend setters? 
6) What are the common interests ,:llIlony thi~5 !n'~f;<."'~t"? 
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These questions will help the marketer define who 
comprises the target market and what the needs of these 
consumers are. Once the consumer has been defined. then 
strategies can be created to meet these needs. 
2. De~ine the Competition 
After the consumer has been defined and his/her needs 
identified. the next step of the market analysis is to 
analyze the competition. In his book Building Your Business 
Plan. Harold J. McLaughlin (1985) describes the steps to 
take in this evaluation. The first step is to know who the 
competitors are in the market. This can be found through 
the government offices. research. and the consumer's 
themselves. On~e the competition is found. then an analysis 
of their "products. strengths. weaknC:38GS, capabilities and 
limitations ... " should be performed (McLaughlin. 1985, 
p. 20) . 
A knowledge of the competition's product line, prices. 
image, and advertising methods are necessary to create 
Btrategies to increase personal advantage in the market. 
Some of the questions that the marketer can use to determine 
some of these factors include: 
1) Are the competition's prices at. below 'or above 
fair market value? 
2) Why are the products priced in this way? 
3) Does the competition satisfy the demand. or is the 
market saturated? 
An analysis of the competition along these basic 
guidelines. with a specific relation to the company'~ tnY~At 
. market. will give an overview of who the competition is anrl 
what strategies they are using to ca.pture the c!)nBUIflr::l', 
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After this analysis is completed. then the marketer can move 
on to developing a strategy for his/her company. 
3. De~ine the Image 
The product line which the jewelry store carries 
ident if ies the company and creates the niche necess.3.ry to 
survive. When deciding upon the merchandise. the company 
must remember the image of the store and the needs of the 
target market. 
High-end retail stores in the jewelry industry carry 
items such as flawless diamonds. exclusive designs. dnd 
pieces created in eighteen karat gold and/or platinum. At 
the other end of the spectrum are those stores which c.3.rry 
synthetic stones. fashion jewelry. and low quality, 
inexpensive goods. There are also m.3.ny stores which fa.Il 
into the center which have no distinct product line to set 
them apart from the competition, 
The high-end jewelry stores. therefore. will create 
the image of quality. service and the ability to reach a 
particular consumer who relies upon these characteristics. 
The other stores may be p.erceived as trying to cater to too 
many niches and uncert.aint.y within the consumer as to the 
actual quality of the merchandise, 
According to Buchanan and Yochim (1991 October). Tivol 
Jewelers is an established high-end jewelry company based in 
Kansas City. MO. Thomas Tivol describes some of the product 
lines which should not be ca.rried when maintaining a niche 
in this particular type of market. He admits that the advice 
he gives ca.n be " ... controvers j.'j 1 , , ,'; (' Buchanan and Yocr1 if!!: 
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1991 October. p.40). but it does make sense if one is trying 
to create or maintain this niche. He feels that a high-end 
jeweler should not carry synthetic stones. lasered or 
treated diamonds. anything less than eighteen karat gold. 
hollow chains or bracelets. lightly made or poorly cast 
jewelry. costume jewelry or imperfect diamonds. 
Good tactics for creating a niche through the product 
line in a high-end market are to buy high quality, unique 
goods from lesser known sources and to identify social or 
charitable organizations in the community for the 
opportunity to speak at their gatherings because it 
"enhances ... credibility and distinguishes a store ... " 
(Buchanan and Yochim. 1991 October. p.40). 
James Rubenstein (1991 August) also gives some tips for 
Gye,~ting a rnarket niche. These are directly related to the 
development of a unique market niche. These tip:=:: includf: 
~~eing the current. prospective and past customers in 
person. This will allow the customer to feel comfo:rtij.blt> Ft 
their choice of company and adds a personalized touch. 
Another tactic is to start a direct mail program. TIlie. 
could include brochures of the products or invitations to 
come into the store. These are ideas that the markAt.=>Y i.:;in 
ue.e to reach the high-end consumer who:, re 1 i es c,n se:nli 1'::8. 
Ci.nd thiB promoteB the quality and inmage of the orgdlll-..:;,::tL.UCi 
The president of Jewelers of America. Mike Roman. 
stated in the article by Buchanan and Yochim that the 
product ~ixes of the 1990's may have to change in generdl 
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include such items as " ... lower quality merchandise, lighter 
weights [and] synthetic stones .... [in order to] preserve 
price points ... " (Buchanan and Yochim, 1991 October, p.42). 
Diamonds also may change in the product I ine for the fh-m::: 
that must protect thir price points to include ", .. smaller 
sizes, slightly lower quality, [and] champagne-colored 
diamonds ... " (Buchanan and Yochim, 1991 October. p.42) in 
order to survive. These are possibilities that the company 
and the consumer must consider depending on the market niche 
involved and the image portrayed by the store. 
Hodgetts and Kuratko describe signals which can 
indicate if the company is in danger of losing it.s market 
niGhe. The signals which indicate that this may occur 
include: 1) many customers leave the store without buying 
anything, 2) many former customers no longer shop at the 
store. J) customers are not urged to buy additional 
products or trade-up for more expensive ones. 4) the 
tr,~ffic in the store has fallen considerably. 5) the retlH ns 
have Increased. 6) this months sales are down from the 
previous month, 7) employees are slow in greetinq 
cUBtomers. are not neat in personal appearance and appear 
indifferent, 8) salespeople lack knowledge of the fiim'::~ 
merchandise. 9) the store has a reputation for being greedy 
due to higher prices and 10) better qualified employ~~~ nye 
taking pOSitions with competitors. 
Creating and maintaining a market niche i:..; v(~ty 
.~ 
\ important for the survival of a company. In the jewelry 
industry in part i r.u I ar, it is vi ta 1 . Wi thou t .~. m::t[')uc t 
30 
niche. there are virtually no f 
actors to distinguish a 
particular company. create an image. and identify the 
quality and service it offers. 
4. 
After defining the niche which the company desires or 
has created. a pricing structure must be determined. The 
price is relative to both the product line carried and the 
ability of the consumers within the target market to 
purchase. According to Mike Roman. the choice of jewelers 
is " ... to raise prices to maintain profit or absorb the loss 
in order to maintain market share ... (because] prices are 
being pushed up by competition for high quality goods ... " 
(Buchanan and Yochim. 1991 October. p.41). 
The competition within the United States alone has 
drastically increased within the past few years. Appendix K 
shows that more jewelry stores are being opened as mure 
malls have been developed. These statistics indicate that 
the environment is much more competitive and therefore. 
price will be a major determinant in the future. 
When determining the retail price for products. many 
faeter::: mU9t be concidered. The fi.rst is to an~ly'Ze the 
current situ~tion of the company. T1-1i5 can be accomplished 
10 two waYB, According to Steven D. Poppell (19851. one way 
is to analyze sales trends and the other is to analyz~ 
individual products. 
In analyzing sales trends. volume is the basis for 
comp~rison. There ~re four c~tegories which can be 
evaluated. The first is to compare th t th t th e curren mon_ _0 _. e 
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previous month. This will show spending trends of consumers 
-, 
by month. The second comparison would be to evalu,3.te t""ie 
current month in contrast to the same month the previous 
year. This will indicate patterns in purchasing consistency 
from year to year. The third is to compare sales from the 
current year to the previous. This should also be a part of 
the financial analysis. but will show patterns from one year 
to the next. Finally. a comparison of previous projections 
compared to actual results will show any deviations from the 
expected yearly sales. 
The second analysis which should be performed is one 
in which the individual product lines are evaluated. The 
contribution of each category to profit margin and 
percentage to total sales is part of the evaluation. and 
-
""i '.1 inrl.icate ''''hich 1 ines have the higher rates of return. 
These are the product lines which should be emphasi~~d. 
After the andlysis is completed. the most profitable 
be clearly indic,~ted. This, h;::'''l8'·!er. should not bt3 the 
basis upon which pri~es are determined. 
be considered. 
One factor is hew the competition prices theif 
products. In the jewelry industry. price-cutting i~ A mp~n~ 
fer survival. and to overpri~e goods in comparison to the 
~ompetition is a way to lose potential sales. 
Another factor is the weakness of the dollar in 
-- relation to foreign currencies. For this industry. this 
l"Ile,3.ne: th,:3.t the lower dollar makes the foreign products much 
3 '") . '-
more expensive for the United States retailers. 
-, 
The demand for the product itself is another factor 
that must be considered. Whether demand is elastic or 
inelastic will playa role on how much the retailer can 
c:ha.rge the consumer for the goods. 
A final factor is to base the price so that it is 
consistent with the overall marketing strategy. The price 
must reflect the consumer' needs and the image of the 
company. 
The retail industry uses two methods to determine and 
set the prices of their products. One is mark-up and the 
other is mark-on. According to Hodgetts and Kuratko. 
mark-up is the difference between the selling price ~n~ ~he 
cost of goods and an average mark-up is used across product 
lint2s. In determining the mark-up, a percpntage ,::of th~ !_· .. ~;1 
is added to the cost to determine the retail price of th€ 
good. M~rk-0n is ~n incre~8e over and above the initial 
mark up that can be used as an incentive for reduction in 
the price of the good later. Most jewelry stores US~ a 
mark-~r pricing system, and as noted in Appendix L. thi= 
mark-up has changed in the past ten years depending ~n ~~~ 
~0~t to the jeweler. 
An analysis. a consideration of factors and a syslem 
of pril~inq ,~re all elements h'hich contribute to the '.~)'.f~Y.~!l I 
price which the company should charge for its merchandise. 
With the price-cutting and the competitiveness of the 
-
jndustyy. much consideration mllst be given to the price. 
Cefi~E the Ad~ertising 
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Advertising is also an important function in creating 
demand for the product and increasing sales. A 
well-developed advertising campaign has many advantages and 
there are many types of advertising which are successful HI 
attracting customers to an individual jewelry store. 
Hodgetts and Kuratko identify many advantages of 
a.dvertising. The first is that it creates "drawing power" 
(Hodgetts and Kuratko, 1989, p.321). Good advertising will 
successfully draw people into the store. A second advantage 
is that it creates customer loyalty as long as the 
advertising is consistent with the practices and image of 
the compdny. A third advantage is that advertising 
identifies a company with the goods and services i~ offers. 
".1'1 i ch he 1 ps to create the image of the company and C"~,=; t- e 
Cfoodwi 11 . If done correctly. advertising will help to 
create sales and build the market niche. 
The National Retai 1 Merchants Association sLltes thrlt 
.. if a:: average store stopped advert is i ng, bus j n~ss w(·u.l d. 
go out in three to four years due to a 20-25% loss of 
customers per year .. ," (Hodget ts and Kura tko, 1989, p. :321 .! 
There are many methods of advertising which are 
successful in the jewelry industry, In an al'Licl,c' :1_,1, i·.t'r: 
--
He~lrt 3, Jim Sanders of Sanders J ewe 1 ers re 1 a tes hi s most 
successful means of advertisement as "" ,everything fr0~ 
direct mail to radio. t.V .. newspapers. handouts (and) P.R, 
~..,ork .. (Hartmann. 1991 ,January/February. p.44) 
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These channels must be conducive to the customer which 
the advertising is attempting to reach within the target 
market. Point-of-sale displays and word-of-mouth 
advel-tising must not be ignored as successful methods of 
advertising. The displays of the jewelry within the store 
reflect an image. and they should be interesting. unique and 
appealing to the eye. The word-of-mouth advertising i::~ 
important because the customer will inform people whether or 
not he/she has received good service by friendly salespeople-
at a fair price. 
C. Financial Analysis: Zale Corp. 
A financial analysis is a very important part of 
understanding the company. This analysis will give an 
overview of any problems within the company that pertain to 
the assets. liabilities. net worth. sales. expenses and 
profits. These are necessary factors for the manager to 
recognize in order for strategies to be developed to counter 
any problems that arise from this analysis. 
1. An Overview 
Zale Corp. is the nation's largest retailer of fine 
jewelry. This is with respect to both total sales a.nd 
number of retai 1 locat ions. The company is a su.bsidi,:try of 
People'e Jewellers and Swarovski International Holdings. 
A.G. On June 28. 1989. Zale Corp. acquired Gordon's 
Jewelers. the nation's second largest retailer of fine 
1436.7 million. At t~i2 t~xe. the operations also moved 
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from Texas to Delaware. 
Fiscal year 1992 has not been a good year for Zale 
Corp. The company had annual sales in 1991 of approxima.tel)· 
$1.34 billion and debt of approximately $1.2 billion. Trlis 
includes a $158 million interest and bonds payment (Bereso 
1992 January 1). This debt load carries approximately 71% 
of their capital needs. 
The second quarter losses (quarter ending September 
30) were $84.95 million and on December 2. 1991. the comp,3.ny 
failed to make a $52 million interest payment on their junk 
bonds. The company held their creditors at bay until after 
the Christmas holiday season. however. sales dropped 
dramatically from the previous year and Zale Corp. was 
unable to make the payment. As the company began to receive 
involuntary petitions against them for action. Zale Corp. 
filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy on January 23. 1992. 
A financial analysis is evaluating the company on the 
basis of industry averages. There are two parts to the 
analysis. One is to compare the company's assets. 
iiabilities. net worth and income statement categories to 
the industry average. The second part involves the use of 
f'atios. where these different areas are compared to each 
other to show how effectively the company has utilized rh~m 
in comparison to the industry. 
" 
,.. . Ratio Analysis 
Hodgetts and Kuratko suggest that an analysis of two 
periods of time are best. Ratio analysis can only be u~Fd 
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good or bad can only be based on an understanding of what 
other firms in the industry are doing and how they a:re 
performing. 
The Annual Report of Zale Corp. in 1991 provides the 
data for the analysis, and the Annual Statement Studies 
(1991) by Robert Morris and Associates provides the industry 
averages. [The 1991 Balance Sheet and Income Statement for 
Zale Corp. is located in Appendix M and N, respectively. 
The percentage breakdown in comparison with the industry is 
in Appendix 0 and the ratios are located in Appendix Pl. 
The first step of this analysis is to compare the 
company to the industry in terms of the averages of assets, 
liabilities, net worth and income statement categories. 
Zale Corp. appears to have serious financial problems in 
1990 which have led to further problems in 1991. One of the 
most serious is the low percentage of cash that the company 
has in comparison to the industry. Cash is necessary to pay 
expenses, interest on bonds and loans, anything else that 
requires immediate payment. An inadequate amount of cash 
can create serious financial difficulties. 
The trade receivables of Zale Corp. decreased to well 
below the industry average in 1991. Th' ... lS decrease'was 
undoubtedly due to the sale of a portion of Gordon's 
customer receiv~bles to Ii trust in December, 1990, By 
giving a secondary source those receivables, th~ company 
lost income but also improved this area of their balance 
sheet, 
Zale Corp. 's inventory IS also over 30% lower than the 
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industry average. This means ttlat ei ther the company does 
not have sufficient inventory or their carrying costs are 
less because the inventory is lower priced. Because Zale 
Corp. is attempting to rid itself of inventory to build up 
its cash reserves. the stores probably do not carry high 
priced goods. 
Fixed assets in 1991 are about 4% above the industry 
average. This is not surprising due to the acquisition of 
Gordon's and the subsequent ownership of their plant. 
property and equipment. This has increased from 1990. 
however. which could indicate a possible problem. 
The liability side of the balance sheet appears fine 
throughout the current liabilities. The long-term debt. 
however. is extremely high. This percentage is slightly 
over 40% higher than the industry average. and has increased 
since 1990. TIlis indicates that the company may be 
overleveraged. High long-term debt and low cash and 
equivalents is not a healthy situation for any company. 
Net worth. or the amount of the company that is not 
financed by debt. is low ~ompared to the industry, Thi~ 
percentage is slightly less than 20% lower than the industry 
average. which indicatps t.hat the majority of the (_:urnpdil/ E~ 
dependent upon debt ~8 capit~l. Another problem indicated 
is that if ~nything happened to the company. the ~ypdit0Y8 
of Zale Corp. own more of the company than the partnership 
who acquired it. 
The income statement categories also indicate some 
possible problem ,3.yeae, GY055 profit. or the amount l,=.ft: 
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after the cost of goods sold is subtracted. is about 15% 
lower than the industry. This indicates that the company IS 
not sell ing at a price that is benefici,:d to profit. The 
margin between the cost and the selling price is lower than 
the industry's average. Operating expenses. however. are 
also lower than the industry average. which is beneficial 
for offsetting the lower margin. 
Other expenses are very high compared to the industry. 
This is partially due to the remodeling of some of the 
stores in various divisions and high interest expense for 
carrying the amount of debt that Zale Corp. is currently 
carrying. 
Profit before taxes fell substantially in 1991 to a 
--
loss of about 22.8% for 1991. This loss indicates that 
sales were lower than expected or that costs were too high. 
The weak economy and low Christmas sales exemplified this 
loss in profit. 
Once the analyst knows how Zale Corp. compares to the 
industry in these areas. then the ratio analysis can truly 
beg-in, These ratios compare different elements of the 
balance sheet and income statement to each other in order to 
gain a better perspective. 
The current ratio rose from 1990 to 1991. This is 
current assets divided by current liabilities and thiA t~ti0 
is a rough indication of the firm's ability to handle its 
current obligations. In 1991. Zale Corp. does not seem to 
have a problem meeting their obligations. however. the 
l.,-~.'=: ::-~.=;.~2t- .. = .. ~ ;-.-.--.-, ~ :-]~~i ~ ~-, 
--- - -'" - .- - -.- - "- . _... - -- ..... - 15"".: 
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determining the accuracy of the ratio. 
The quick ratio expresses the degree to which the 
company can meet the current obligations with its most 
liquid assets. Any value less than a one to one ratio show 
a dependency on inventory for the payment of all short-term 
debt. Zale Corp. 's quick ratio is not as promising as their 
current ratio appears to be. 
8<3.l e5 to rece i vab 1 es. or the number of times that 
tnide receivables turn over each year. This !,d.tio iJ.:!.:j 
improved substantially from 1990 to 1991. This is most 
likely due to the sale of Gordon's receivables to the 
Becondary source. 
The cost of sales to inventory measures the number of 
time th.:l.t inventory is turned over throughout the year. 
Zale Corp. appears to perform well in that particular ratio. 
The cost of sales to payables measures the nllmber of tirI!eB 
that the trade payables are turned over each year. Zale 
Corp. is below the industry average in this ratio .. wrllr.:h 
indicates that there may be cash shortages. extended tellTIS 
or expctnding credit. 
Sales to working capital (where working capital is 
current assets less current liabilities) is slightly .:tb(Ne 
the industry average. which according to this ratio. 
indicates that the margin is great enough for protection 
from the creditors 
The ratios just described are referred to as liquidity 
.tdtiu~. wlwre their purpose is to relate the asset::: the 
company possesses to how well they are using them. The next 
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ratios are coverage ratios. which will indicate the firm's 
ability to meet its debt. 
The firm's earning before interest and taxes against 
, 
the interest itself will show the company's ability to meet 
interest payments. Zale Corp. 's ratio is extremely low 
compared to tje industry. which means that the debt is 
extremely high. The company can not afford to take on any 
more debt. 
The debt to worth ratio is also worth examining. Zale 
Corp. has a much higher percentage than the indust:ry cj()e!3, 
.:1.lthough it had decreased in the past year. This reveals 
that Zale Corp. has borrowed capital to finance itself in 
the past few years rather than build up equity. 
Another type of ratio is the operating ratio which 
will evaluate management performance. The percent profit 
before taxes to net worth and percent profit before t2YP~ to 
total assets are down substantially from the previous year. 
This is obviously a result of a weak economy and lr)h' :~;,:tl':8, 
Sales to fixed and total assets are also types of operating 
ratios that will indicate the productive use of the fjx~d 
assets, and the ability to generate sales in relation to 
total assets. Zale Corp. falls very low in both (if tb_';.:e 
areas. 
3. Evaluation 
Zale Corp. was not in a positive position before 1991. 
One of the biggest mistakes that the company made was 
acquiring Gordon Jewelers in 1989 through the U5~ of 
long-term debt. The interest payments on the bonds that the 
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company issued was a major factor that caused them to file 
bankruptcy. 
Zale Corp. needs to completely realign itself within 
the market. Consumers and employees have lost faith in the 
company, as well as investors. These trends were obvious 
into 1990. and some of these problems should have been taken 
care of before 1991. Zale Corp .. under the protection of 
Chapter 11, must basically start again with image, market 
niche. and any competitive advantage which they might have 
once held. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The jewelry industry is in the midst of rough times. 
The only strategy for the companies that remain in the 
industry is survival. There are many opportunities for a 
company to develop strategies to gain some type of advantage 
in the market. The strategies revolve around three 
functional areas of the business: management, marketing and 
finance. 
The first step in survival is to understand the 
conditions of the industry. If the manager/marketer/ 
analyst does not know what the industry is doing, then 
he/she has no basis for comparison and no guidelines to 
follow. 
It is also extremely important that the manager 
understand the sources of failure and success. Recognizing 
any of the pitfalls described in this paper may save the 
company because astra t egy can be deve loped be fore hand t (, 
42 
--
counter the problem. Characteristics of success are also 
important to understand because the manager can use them as 
the goals or objectives of a strategy. 
The functional areas of the business are so overlapped 
that it is very difficult to separate distinct roles. 
Management is responsible for recognizing changing trends in 
consumer behavior and demographics; the ability to 
understand the financial aspect of the company; maintaining 
employee satisfaction; developing strategies to increase 
sales and maintain market niches; and creating innovative 
ideas and product mixes to counter the competition. improve 
the image of the company and meet the needs of the consumer. 
Tactics for accomplishing these objectives include 
following the consumer trends. Another is to understand the 
basic information in the financial statements in order to 
analyze the company on this basis. Another method is to 
increase employee satisfaction through training and a 
Management By Objectives program. 
The marketing aspect involves many different areas, 
also. Defining the consumer involves identifying the target 
market. and the needs of the consumers within this market. 
The competition must be defined and analyzed along product 
lines. price points. management skills and strengths and 
we.:tknesses. The image of the company must also be defined. 
The most effective method of achieving this objective i::o:; 
through the product line. which will help create a niche in 
the market. The pricing structure must also be det~nni'-~ed 
to include the mark-up and other factors. such as the 
43 
--
economy and the competition. in the price of the good. 
Finally. advertising must be integrated to reinforce all of 
these objectives. 
If management would implement some of these ideas into 
their business practices. the chance for failure in the 
jewelry industry. or any industry. is greatly reduced. The 
manager is prepared for the changes and has knowledge about 
the marketplace and the consumer. The industry is 
definitely changing. and companies like Zale Corp. will not 
survive without controlling the enormous amounts of debt 
that they have accumulated in the past few years. Perhaps 
in a few years. everyone will shopping for cut. clarity. 
color and carat weight in the smaller. independent retail 
stores. 
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DIAMOND ENGAGEMENT RINGS: CARAT WEIGHT 
Weight of center %of Panelists' unit sales in: 
diamond In 
engagement rings 1976 ' 1978 1981 1984 ·1986 1988 1990 
1-10 pt. 5.2% 11.1% 14.6% 12.7% ' 6.8% ' 5.7% 4.5% 
11-20 pt. 17.9 . 17.9 18.2 23.9 17.1 9.4 6.5 
21-30 pt. 25.1 23.6 ,22.3 ' 14.1 18.4 16.8 9.7 
31-40 pt. 15.5 13.0 '14.1 ' 11.3 ,11.0 12.3 7.1 ~ --; 
41-50 pt. 10.6 ' " 7.4 i 8.0 ' 11.3 11.8 11.9 12.9 
51-60 pt. 8.4 5.6 ' t 6.4 -~. 8.4 \ 7.5 9.0 9.7 
61-70 pl 3.2 2.7 i 2.6 :, 2.8 6.1 5.3 7.1 
71-80 pt. 3.7 " 3.2 ,! 1.5 4.2 : 4.5 4.1 7.7 
81-90 pl 1.9 2.0 ~. 3.6 ,: 4.2 '! 1.9 3.7 . 5.8 
91-100 pt. 1.9 1.2 ~ to :, 1.4 , 4.2 6.0 '. 7.7 
1.0-2.0 ct. 6.6 . 12.3 : ~ 6.4 ,~ 5.7 8.1 12.1 ' 17.4 
2.0-plus ct. N.A. : N.A. ': 1.3 ' 0.0 ' 2.6 3.7 3.9 
Total 100% 100% . 100% 100% 100% 100%- 100% 
Median weight 30 pt. 28 pt. ,27 pt. 30 pt. 36 pt. 48 pt. 60 pt. 
Source: 
Shor, Russell ---
(1991 June) DIAMOND ENGAGEMENT RINGS: COLOR p. 53-60 % of engagement diamonds sold by JCK Panelists In: 
GIA colo, grade 1976 1978 1981 1984 1986 1988 ' 1990 
0, E, F 29.6% 15.6% 9.9% 6.4% 12.8% 17.9% 11.4% 
G, H,I 58.3 61.9 64.6 ,72.3 61.4 60.8 60.4 
J, K, L 10.7 18.0 22.6 21.3 22.7 20.3 26.2 
M, N, 0 1.4 4.5 2.9 0.0 3.1 1.0 2.0 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Median color G H H H H H H 
.-~ ... ·~.r....,'""'!-··-·~. ~ ~ "'?1"-~'--__ ~ •. _ ... 
'1 
DIAMOND ENGAGEMENT RINGS: CLARITY 
. ': % of entalement diamonds sold by JCK Panellstl In: 
GIA clarity "ade 1176··~: 1978 : ~ 1981 H 1984 :! ~ 1986 j 1988" 1990) 
FL, IF 4.1~~r 3.9% :ito% .. ~; 0.0% r: 1.1%':' O.4%.r 0.7% . " 
WS1 13.9·'4f;5.6 :1t;3.7·d~6.5 ,~,4.6· 5.8 -~ 5.2 
WS2 12.71'13.2 '~:6.8:r~ 3.2;:"5.0· 4.9 ~ .. 5.2 
VS1 27.1 '·,17.1 '~·17.3 i~22.6:z11.7 '15.2 17.6 
-
V82 13.9 -' 18.2'14.2 n 21.0' 15.9 14.2 ,14.4 
811 9.8 i' 11.5 26.2" 35.5 . 24.3 25.9 19.0 
9.6 10.7 15.7 4.8 22.0 18.2 22.2 
Imp 8.9 19.8 15.1 6.4 15.4 15.4 15.7 
Median clarity VS, '. V52 51, 811 
-APPENDIX C 
MAY 1991 REGIONAL SALES AND ECONOMIC FACTORS THAT AFFECT THEM 
NORTHEAST ~ change change ($ mil.) from '90 from '90 
Retail sales Consumer Price Index 141.7 +5.2% 
Total $32,652 -1.4% Unemployment rate 7.4% +48.0% 
General merchandise 3,337 +7.0 Help-wanted ads 47.5 -31.7% 
Department stores 2,589 +5.9 New single homes sold 5,000 -28.6% 
Automotive dealers 6,760 -6.9 New jewelry firms 9 -8 
AppareVaccessories 2,020 +1.7 Jewelry firm failures 6 +3 
Retail sales Consumer Price Index 132.5 +4.7% 
Total $54,152 +4.1% Unemployment rate 6.6% +26.9~ 
General merchandise 6,265 +2.8 Help-wanted ads 136.0 -24.3% 
Department stores 5,105 +4.8 New single homes sold 18,000 -10.0% 
Automotive dealers 12,963 +5.6 New jewelry firms 31 -10 
Apparel/accessories 2,476 +1.3 Jewelry firm failures 16 +7 
MIDWEST 
Retail sales Consumer Price Index 132.3 +5.0% 
Total $38,629 +5.7% Unemployment rate 6.0% +20.0% 
General merchandise 4,934 + 10.9 Help-wanted ads 65.0 -26.6% 
Department stores 4,075 +11.4 New single homes sold 10,000 +11.1% 
Automotive dealers 8,614 -1.3 New jewelry firms 10 -1 
Apparel/accessories 1,759 +10.7 Jewelry firm failures 7 +3 
WEST 
Retail sales Consumer Price Index 136.3 +4.9% ~ Total $33,786 +1.3% Unemployment rate 6.6% +26.9% - : :~~' ~'i;.~;' General merchandise 3,546 +1.5 Help-wanted ads 199.5 -29.0% OQ Department stores 2,816 +3.4 New single homes sold 12,000 -14.3% "<Q" Automotive dealers 6,291 -9.2 New jewelry firms 9 -7 
C'1 .. AppareVaccessories 1,745 -1.4 Jewelry firm failures 9 +6 
. '»' 
Footnotes: Alilfres are from the u.s. govemment except jewelry firm starts and failures from the Jewelers Board of Trade. Figures showing the change from '90 are percentages except 
for those from J T, which are the actual number of firms. Regions are defined by the government tsee maps). Exception: JBT counts Colorado. Delaware. Kansas. Missouri, New Mexico 
and Washington. D.C., in the South. CPI/1982-'84 = 100. Help-wanted ad statistics are from a orTference Board index (1967 = 1 00) of malor metropolitan areas. N.C. = no change. 
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Pf~RSONAL CONSUMPTION OF JEWELRY 
FROM 1980 TO 1991 
IN BILLI ONS OF 1982 ($) 
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TYPE OF GOODS 
CJJEWELRY 
. []DURABLES 
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'"tl 
'"tl 
tJ:j 
:z: 
t::1 
H 
:x: 
t::1 
SOURCE: 
DIAMOND REGISTRY 
'5/31/91 
-Personal Co~sumption 
EX,Jenditllre 
8501 
8502 
8503 
8504 
8601 
8602 
8603 
8604 
8701 
8702 
8703 
8704 
8801 
8802 
8803 
8804 
8901 
8902 
8903 
8904 
9001 
9002 
9003 
9004 
9101 
9102 
9103 
9104 
"GC82" 
2319.100 
2337.400 
2375.900 
2386.900 
2410.900 
2432.400 
2464.400 
2477.800 
2482.200 
2509.900 
2536.600 
2534.200 
2576.800 
2594.100 
2616.400 
2638.800 
2636.700 
2645.300 
2675.300 
2669.900 
2677.300 
2678.800 
2696.800 
2673.600 
2663.700 
2680.500 
2705.300 
N/A 
APPENDIX E 
Gross National Product 
8501 
8502 
8503 
8504 
8601 
8602 
8603 
8604 
8701 
8702 
8703 
8704 
8801 
8802 
8803 
8804 
8901 
8902 
8903 
8904 
9001 
9002 
9003 
9004 
9101 
9102 
9103 
9104 
"GNP82" 
3577.500 
3599.200 
3635.800 
3662.400 
3721.100 
3704.600 
3712.400 
3733.600 
3781.200 
3820.300 
3858.900 
3920.700 
3970.200 
4005.800 
4032.100 
4059.300 
4095.700 
4112.200 
4129.700 
4133.200 
4150.600 
4155.100 
4170.000 
4153:400 
4124.100 
4118.900 
4143.100 
N/A 
Source: Bureau of Business Research, Ball State University 
APPENDIX F 
DE BEEES PRICE INCREASES 
FOR ROUGH DIA1IIOiiDS 
Septe:nhel' , 1949 25.0% 
r.larch, 1951 15.0 
Septerncer, 1952 2.5 
~;anuary ; 1.95~ /..0 
Ja.nuary, 1957 5.7 
i.12..Y , 1960 ?.5 
March, 1.963 5.0 
F8bruary, 196J~ tu10.0 
A i.L~.rtl s t , 1966 7.5 ~, 
1967 J.6.6 No V!-:IT. '0'2 r , 
September, 19G3 2.5 
July, 1969 4.0 
November, 1971 5 • .0 
January, ] 972 5.4 
Septernuer, 1972 6.0 
February, 1973 11.0 
March, 197) 7.0 
May, 1973 10.0 
August, 1973 10.2 
December, 1974 1.5 
J"nuary, 1976 3.0 
September., 1976 5. '15 
March, 1977 15.0 
December, 1977 l7.0 
August, 1978 30.0 
SepteUlber, .1979 IJ.O 
-Source: 
APPENDIX G 
DIAMOND PRODUCTION LEADERS 
All members of the "million-carat club" now market most or all of 
their production through De Beers' Central Selling Organisation. 
Total production 
Country (millions) % gem/near gem % sold to CSO 
Angola 1.2 95% 75-80% 
Australia 35.2 50 73 (a) 
Botswana 17.0 65 100 
Namibia 1.1 97 99(b} 
South Africa 9.3 41 95 
USSR 12.0 45 80(c) 
Zaire 19.0 15 50(d) 
Production based on 1990 estimates 
(a) 25% of near gem and industrials are sold independently through Argyle's Antwerp 
sales office. A small but high-value portion of gem material is retained for local polishing. 
(b) All of Namibia's land-based production is in De Beers-owned mines. Samples from 
independent off-shore exploration account for the estimated 1%. 
(c) The Soviets retain an estimated 20% of gem production for local polishing. 
(d) The CSO has a sales contract with Zaire's state-run mining firm accounting for half 
the production. Artismal diggers produce the rest for sale on the open market. 
Shor, 1991 October, p. 69 
APPENDIX H 
CSO ROUGH DIAMOND SALES 1982-1991 H 
(billion $) 
4.5 
4.0 
3.5 
3.0 
2.5 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
'82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 
Source:cso 
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Figure 2 
ENVIRONMENT/RESPONSE MATRIX 
CLASSIFICATION OF GENERIC APPROACHES TO TURNAROUND 
CeI" Cell II 
Internal Policies Analysis 
Procedures Planning 
Rules Positioning 
Systems 
Cell III Cell IV 
Externa' Product Development 
Risk Management Diversification 
Niching 
Market Development 
Market Penetration 
Administrative Strategic 
RESPONSE 
Boyle and Desai, 1991 July, p. 38 
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ZALE CORP. IN COMPARISON WITH ROBERT NORRIS 
ASSET INDUSTRY ZALE INDUSTRY ZALE 
1991 1990 
Cash & Equiv. 6.6% 1.1% 6.3% 0.4% 
Trade Receiv. 11.9 5.4 14.4 24.0 
Inventory 66.7 34.6 63.8 30.9 
All other CA 1.6 11.1 1.3 3.2 
Total CA 86.7 5.2 85.8 58.5 
Fixed Assets 9.2 13.6 9.3 10.8 
Intangibles 0.7 11.9 1.1 9.9 
All other NCA 3.3 22.3 3.8 20.8 
Total Assets 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
LIABILITIES 
Notes/Pay ST 13.5% 12.1% 12.5% 18.2% 
Cur. Na t. LTD 3.4 0.0 3.0 0.0 
Trade Payables 19.6 11.9 20.5 13.1 
Inc Tax Pay 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.0 
All other CL 6.8 0.8 8.5 1.4 
Total CL 43.9 24.8 45.1 32.7 
LT Debt 13.4 53.5 12.7 48.7 
Deferred Tax 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 
All Other NCL 3.4 2.1 3.8 2.1 
Net Worth 39.2 19.6 38.1 16.5 
Total L & N~oJ 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
INCOHE STATENENT 
Net Sales 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Gross Profit 46.2 31.2 46.4 36.2 
Oper. Expense 41.4 26.4 40.7 15.9 
Oper. Profit 4.7 4.7 5 . 7 7 . 5 
All other expo 1.8 12.0 1.5 12.7 
Profit Bef Tax 3.0 -22.8 4.2 3.3 
RATIOS 
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